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<title><![CDATA[ ParaCyberBellum Security Review ]]></title>
<description><![CDATA[ Cybersecurity technical stuff on the fly ]]></description>
<link>https://library.paracyberbellum.io/rss</link>
<atom:link href="https://library.paracyberbellum.io/rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
<language>en</language>
<pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 06:14:24 +0000</pubDate>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] DCOM Service PsmServiceExtHost LPE ]]></title>
<link>https://ssd-disclosure.com/dcom-service-psmserviceexthost-lpe/</link>
<guid>https://ssd-disclosure.com/dcom-service-psmserviceexthost-lpe/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 04:04:27 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Privilege Escalation ] Technical detail of a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in a DCOM service that can be leveraged to achieve LPE from a Medium IL standard user to System IL. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Introduction to Manual Active Directory Querying ]]></title>
<link>https://specterops.io/blog/2021/06/02/an-introduction-to-manual-active-directory-querying-with-dsquery-and-ldapsearch/</link>
<guid>https://specterops.io/blog/2021/06/02/an-introduction-to-manual-active-directory-querying-with-dsquery-and-ldapsearch/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 04:03:32 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Active Directory - Enumeration, Reconnaissance & Scanning - Pentests & Red Teams ] We detail manual Active Directory querying using dsquery (Windows) and ldapsearch (Linux/macOS) to enumerate  AD objects such as users, groups, computers, and attributes. These operations provide situational awareness for offensive assessments by allowing targeted searches with compound filters, wildcards, and attribute queries across domain controllers. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Hope Walker ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] So... You Found AWS Access Keys - Part 1 ]]></title>
<link>https://trustedsec.com/blog/so-you-found-aws-access-keys-part-1</link>
<guid>https://trustedsec.com/blog/so-you-found-aws-access-keys-part-1</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:58:49 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Pentests & Red Teams - Public Cloud ] In this first post of the series, we discuss how AWS plain text access keys enable an attacker to map the target account's infrastructure, access potentially sensitive data, and perform actions that are logged by CloudTrail but may go unnoticed if not monitored. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Lilly Mayo ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] PuzzleMask: Abusing Plain Prose as a Covert AI Attack Vector ]]></title>
<link>https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/puzzlemask-abusing-plain-prose-as-a-covert-ai-attack-vector/</link>
<guid>https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/puzzlemask-abusing-plain-prose-as-a-covert-ai-attack-vector/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:55:37 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Machine Learning & AI ] We introduce a prompt-crafting technique for bypassing quick LLM-based policy checks - using plain English (no emojis, base64, invisible formatting, etc.) This technique is itself not a jailbreak, but it can be combined with one by using a jailbreak prompt as the payload. ]]></description>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Unmasking SCCM Application Execution ]]></title>
<link>https://specterops.io/blog/2026/09/10/unmasking-sccm-application-execution/</link>
<guid>https://specterops.io/blog/2026/09/10/unmasking-sccm-application-execution/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:53:25 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] Executing applications instead of scripts via SCCM’s deploy application feature will generate different artifacts due to the fundamental differences in the execution flow. While existing detection tools can catch script-based execution, they often miss stealthier methods. This post covers how to detect the more evasive SCCM application execution. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Joshua Prager ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Peeling the Sentinel: A Market-Leading EDR Comes Apart With Undergraduate Tools ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.nullze.net/posts/peeling-the-sentinel/</link>
<guid>https://blog.nullze.net/posts/peeling-the-sentinel/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:52:10 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ EDR - Reverse Engineering ] We found  that SentinelOne Agent easily stores its key assets using only a static 11-byte XOR key, an embedded RC4 key, and a simple XOR-0xFF transform, enabling offline decryption with minimal effort. This exposes the full detection policy, trust allow-lists, and a behavioral model that bases its verdict on a single feature, compromising the confidentiality of the EDR's detection logic. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Nullze ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] No Extensions? You Forgot One: Writing Shared Objects to RCE via SQLite's dbpage ]]></title>
<link>https://gabdevele.dev/posts/sqlite-dbpage-shared-objects-rce/</link>
<guid>https://gabdevele.dev/posts/sqlite-dbpage-shared-objects-rce/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:43:56 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] In this post, I introduce a novel technique to finally break free from SQLite’s magic bytes and almost the entirety of its database header. It relies on writing ELF shared objects and leads to code execution in Python, Ruby, and Node.js using the sqlite_dbpage virtual table. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Paolo Gabriele Schiraldi ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Beltdown: Escaping the Claude Code sandbox ]]></title>
<link>https://www.accomplish.ai/blog/beltdown-escaping-the-claude-code-sandbox/</link>
<guid>https://www.accomplish.ai/blog/beltdown-escaping-the-claude-code-sandbox/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:41:47 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Machine Learning & AI ] An untrusted repository opened in Claude Code can escape the macOS sandbox and run commands on your computer as your privileged user. You never get the permission prompt. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Oren Yomtov ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] How to hack APIs in 2026 ]]></title>
<link>https://labs.detectify.com/how-to/how-to-hack-apis-in-2026/</link>
<guid>https://labs.detectify.com/how-to/how-to-hack-apis-in-2026/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security ] API hacking in 2026 focuses on exploiting expanded attack surfaces such as ubiquitous GraphQL endpoints, increasingly complex OAuth/OIDC flows, and AI-backed APIs. The impact ranges from unauthorized data access and account takeover to internal network pivoting, credential leakage, unbounded resource consumption, and financial loss. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Luke Stephens ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Windows Security Center ]]></title>
<link>https://ipurple.team/2026/09/09/windows-security-center/</link>
<guid>https://ipurple.team/2026/09/09/windows-security-center/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 07:17:40 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] Threat actors can abuse the Windows Security Center (WSC) API to disable Windows Defender protections by faking the registration of an antivirus product. The technique enables threat actors to degrade the security on endpoints without generating the usual tampering indicators or introduce a driver. ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Out of Bounds, Out of Sandbox: RCE in Go JavaScript Engine ]]></title>
<link>https://www.slcyber.io/research/out-of-bounds-out-of-sandbox-rce-goja</link>
<guid>https://www.slcyber.io/research/out-of-bounds-out-of-sandbox-rce-goja</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:54:12 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] An out-of-bounds heap write bug in the Goja JavaScript engine, which is embedded in applications such as Grafana k6, PocketBase, Nuclei and Zendesk's action-flows feature, allows arbitrary read/write and remote code execution on the affected products. ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Chinese Implants in the Supply Chain ]]></title>
<link>https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-darklantern-speakingstone</link>
<guid>https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-darklantern-speakingstone</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:50:18 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Keyloggers, Backdoors & Rootkits ] The Deep Orange 3G/4G/LTE Router, is a white-labeled ZBT-WE826-T2. We exploited a vulnerability in the telnet interface and rooted the device. With root access, we found the router's firmware was built in 2019, and provided with 2 implants. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Jacob Baines ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] ENDLESSDOORS Is Phoning Home ]]></title>
<link>https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-endlessdoors</link>
<guid>https://www.vulncheck.com/blog/zbt-endlessdoors</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:47:46 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Keyloggers, Backdoors & Rootkits ] Twenty router models sold on Amazon, AliExpress, and Alibaba ship with a remote-control implant enabled by default. It runs as root, it uses no encryption, and it authenticates nobody. Whoever answers the phone owns the device. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Jacob Baines ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Linux Has Screensharing RCEs Too!! ]]></title>
<link>https://bynar.io/blog/linux-has-screensharing-rces-too</link>
<guid>https://bynar.io/blog/linux-has-screensharing-rces-too</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:46:04 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] Deep dive on chaining three FreeRDP bugs to achieve RCE with Gnome Remote Desktop by popping a remote shell with some old school memory corruption shenanigans. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Samuel Page ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] P3 - Shellcode Loader ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/p3-loader</link>
<guid>https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/p3-loader</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:44:20 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Injection - Malwares ] P3-Shellcode Loader is a loader that implements a code injection technique which leverages the Process Parameters structure as an execution and staging location for shellcode injection into remote processes, without triggering common detection mechanisms. ]]></description>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] SensePost ]]></title>
<link>https://sensepost.com/blog/2026/process-parameter-poisoning/</link>
<guid>https://sensepost.com/blog/2026/process-parameter-poisoning/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:41:48 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Injection ] Process Parameter Poisoning (P3) is an attack technique we developed that is used to inject code in foreign processes, without triggering typical detection mechanisms. Its ability to fly under the radar has been tested against four market leading Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions. Code injection succeeded in all cases and no alerts were created, even though the EDRs were configured to detect, block and remediate. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Max Hirschberger, Ogulcan Ugur ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Fileless ELF Execution via Kernel Keyring ]]></title>
<link>https://matheuzsecurity.github.io/hacking/linux-kernel-keyring-fileless-exec/</link>
<guid>https://matheuzsecurity.github.io/hacking/linux-kernel-keyring-fileless-exec/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:38:56 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malwares - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] Using the Linux kernel keyring to stage an ELF in slab memory and execute it via userland exec, skipping execve and the filesystem entirely. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ 0xMatheuZ ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] OPA ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa</link>
<guid>https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 03:11:19 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Hardening - Public Cloud ] Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source, general-purpose policy engine that enables unified, context-aware policy enforcement across the entire stack. ]]></description>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Abusing Remix Routing Discrepancies ]]></title>
<link>https://ethiack.com/info-hub/research/abusing-remix-routing-discrepancies</link>
<guid>https://ethiack.com/info-hub/research/abusing-remix-routing-discrepancies</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:49:59 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security - Exploits & Payloads ] Remix routing discrepancies allow bypassing authentication checks by requesting the .data endpoint, which returns loader data - including sensitive account information such as email and API key - even when the parent route or Express middleware returns 401/403. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Rafael Castilho ]]></author>
</item>
<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Trust Me, I'm the System: Two ArangoDB Bugs, One Root Cause ]]></title>
<link>https://remedio.io/blog/trust-me-im-the-system-arango-db-bugs-secure-system-architecture/</link>
<guid>https://remedio.io/blog/trust-me-im-the-system-arango-db-bugs-secure-system-architecture/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:26:10 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] This is the story of how a seemingly minor parsing flaw exposed a deeper lesson in secure system architecture, trust boundaries, and the danger of components disagreeing about what a request actually means. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Omri Dar ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] JWT Security: How to Secure JWTs and Avoid Common Vulnerabilities ]]></title>
<link>https://pentesterlab.com/blog/how-to-secure-jwts-and-avoid-common-vulnerabilities</link>
<guid>https://pentesterlab.com/blog/how-to-secure-jwts-and-avoid-common-vulnerabilities</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:24:09 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security - Authentication ] A practical guide to securing JSON Web Tokens for developers who use a JWT library. Covers the six things you still have to get right yourself: pinning the algorithm to stop the none and algorithm confusion attacks, using a strong secret, always setting and verifying an expiry, supporting secret and key rotation, logging verification failures, and running a canary to catch silently broken signature checks. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Louis Nyffenegger ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] The Shared Clipboard Inside the Sandbox: Cross-Account Data Leakage in ChatGPT ]]></title>
<link>https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/the-shared-clipboard-inside-the-sandbox-cross-account-data-leakage-in-chatgpt/</link>
<guid>https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/the-shared-clipboard-inside-the-sandbox-cross-account-data-leakage-in-chatgpt/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:22:51 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Machine Learning & AI ] We discovered a covert cross-account command channel through which an attacker could use a victim’s ChatGPT session to execute hidden tasks with the tools, data, and connected apps available to that session.  ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Alexey Bukhteyev ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] TATS ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/IceMoonHSV/TATS</link>
<guid>https://github.com/IceMoonHSV/TATS</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:12:49 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Authentication ] TATS - Token Analysis and Tracking System, tracks OAuth 2.0, OIDC, and Microsoft Entra ID tokens across captured network traffic. Ingests Burp Suite XML exports, mitmproxy flow files, or live Chrome DevTools Protocol streams into a single SQLite database, then serves an interactive web dashboard for filtering tokens, walking exchanges, spotting risky scopes, exporting tokens for replay, and visualising token lifecycles as Mermaid graphs. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Hope Walker ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] LPE Toolkit ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/portbuster1337/lpe-toolkit</link>
<guid>https://github.com/portbuster1337/lpe-toolkit</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:06:21 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Privilege Escalation ] Multi-architecture Linux privilege escalation toolkit with 24 pre-built and runtime-compilable exploits. Auto-detects kernel version, filters patched exploits, tries each until root. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ portbuster1337 ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] NTLMRain ]]></title>
<link>https://lookup.ntlmrain.com/</link>
<guid>https://lookup.ntlmrain.com/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 08:04:11 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Credentials Dumps, Theft and Cracking ] NTLMRain is a tool for recovering NT hashes from NetNTLMv1 responses using local WebGPU computation and remote table lookup. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Cedric Van Bockhaven ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] NetNTLMv1 Is Dead. Long Live NetNTLMv1 ]]></title>
<link>https://www.outflank.nl/blog/2026/09/08/netntlmv1-is-dead-long-live-netntlmv1/</link>
<guid>https://www.outflank.nl/blog/2026/09/08/netntlmv1-is-dead-long-live-netntlmv1/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:57:22 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Credentials Dumps, Theft and Cracking ] NetNTLMv1 cracking is a problem I've kept returning to over the past several years. The recent table release prompted me to explore whether the process could be made cheaper, faster and easier to run. This post describes the result: a compact indexed table format, a WebGPU browser client and a native command-line tool. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Cedric Van Bockhaven ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] AD Rights Management Service - Part 1: Architecture, Deprecation, and Reconnaissance ]]></title>
<link>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ad-rms-architecture-and-recon</link>
<guid>https://www.huntress.com/blog/ad-rms-architecture-and-recon</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:48:17 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Active Directory - Enumeration, Reconnaissance & Scanning ] Active Directory Rights Management Services still ships in Windows Server 2025, and it remains fully supported on-premises. In this first part pf the series, we map the AD RMS trust model and show how to discover an RMS deployment, fingerprint an AD RMS-protected file, and trace the path to that certificate's private key. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Andrew Schwartz ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] AdaptixC2: Fingerprinting an Open-Source C2 Framework at Scale ]]></title>
<link>https://censys.com/blog/adaptixc2-open-source-c2-framework</link>
<guid>https://censys.com/blog/adaptixc2-open-source-c2-framework</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 11:41:05 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ C2 & Exfiltration ] A deep dive into AdaptixC2, an open-source post-exploitation C2 framework whose default configuration ships branded HTTP headers (Server: AdaptixC2, Adaptix-Version: v1.2) on every unauthenticated request, making deployed servers trivially identifiable from passive scanning. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Aidan Holland ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] CNCMachineRMS C2 Protocol ]]></title>
<link>https://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2026-08&post=CNCMachineRMS-C2-Protocol</link>
<guid>https://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2026-08&post=CNCMachineRMS-C2-Protocol</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 09:23:48 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ C2 & Exfiltration ] This post describes the binary command-and-control (C2) protocol used by CNCMachineRMS, a recently identified remote access trojan (RAT). We cover how the protocol was discovered, how its infrastructure was identified, and how network defenders can detect it. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Erik Hjelmvik ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Fileless ELF Execution via O_TMPFILE ]]></title>
<link>https://matheuzsecurity.github.io/hacking/fileless-loader-bypassing-elastic-memfd/</link>
<guid>https://matheuzsecurity.github.io/hacking/fileless-loader-bypassing-elastic-memfd/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 09:22:09 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malwares - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] O_TMPFILE creates anonymous inodes on real filesystems with no directory entry. Combine it with execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) and you get fileless ELF execution that looks nothing like memfd_create in telemetry. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ 0xMatheuZ ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Going depthfirst: Achieving GitLab RCE via Two Ruby Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities ]]></title>
<link>https://depthfirst.com/research/going-depthfirst-achieving-gitlab-rce-via-two-ruby-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities</link>
<guid>https://depthfirst.com/research/going-depthfirst-achieving-gitlab-rce-via-two-ruby-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 09:19:21 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ DevOps - Exploits & Payloads ] We chained two memory-safety flaws in Oj, a native Ruby JSON parser used by GitLab's notebook diff renderer, into remote code execution in a Puma worker. The path begins with an attacker-controlled Jupyter notebook and crosses GitLab, ipynbdiff, CRuby, and jemalloc before reaching function-pointer control. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Yuhang Wu ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] SafeLine ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/chaitin/safeline</link>
<guid>https://github.com/chaitin/safeline</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 09:16:27 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Application Security ] SafeLine is a self-hosted WAF(Web Application Firewall) / reverse proxy to protect your web apps from attacks and exploits. ]]></description>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [REFERENCE] Rust for Malware Development ]]></title>
<link>https://git.smukx.site/smukx/Rust-for-Malware-Development</link>
<guid>https://git.smukx.site/smukx/Rust-for-Malware-Development</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:34:29 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malwares - Pentests & Red Teams ] This repository contains source codes of various techniques used by malware authors, red teamers, threat actors, state sponsored hacking groups etc. These techniques are well researched and implemented in Rust. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Smukx ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] When the Supply-Chain Attack Has No CVE: Inside the Coder Registry Hijack ]]></title>
<link>https://www.optimuslabs.io/research/briefings/coder-registry-infrastructure-hijack</link>
<guid>https://www.optimuslabs.io/research/briefings/coder-registry-infrastructure-hijack</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:31:25 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] We investigate how Coder's own delivery infrastructure was hijacked to serve credential-stealing modules from the real registry.coder.com. No CVE, no poisoned package, nothing for a scanner to match. ]]></description>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Bring Your Own Trusted Caller (BYOTC): A New Way to Exploit Vulnerable Windows Drivers (Part 1) ]]></title>
<link>https://xusheng.dev/posts/byotc/main/</link>
<guid>https://xusheng.dev/posts/byotc/main/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:24:44 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] Bring Your Own Trusted Caller (BYOTC) is a technique that obtains code execution inside the user-mode program a driver already trusts, then make it invoke the privileged interface. The authorization check succeeds, but its security meaning has been lost. BYOTC is therefore a confused-deputy problem at the user/kernel boundary. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Xusheng Li ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Caught in the Octopus Trap: Unauthenticated RCE in Argo CD with CodeQL ]]></title>
<link>https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/caught-in-the-octopus-trap-unauthenticated-rce-in-argo-cd-with-codeql</link>
<guid>https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/caught-in-the-octopus-trap-unauthenticated-rce-in-argo-cd-with-codeql</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:21:35 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We discovered an unauthenticated arbitrary code execution vulnerability in ArgoCD's repo-server component, potentially allowing full cluster compromise. This article explains how the vulnerability was identified using CodeQL, details the exploitation process to gain control over the underlying Kubernetes cluster, and introduces a tool for automating the attack. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Hugo Vincent ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Modern Adventures in Azure Privilege Escalation ]]></title>
<link>https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/cloud-pentesting/modern-adventures-in-azure-privilege-escalation/</link>
<guid>https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/cloud-pentesting/modern-adventures-in-azure-privilege-escalation/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:19:45 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Privilege Escalation - Public Cloud ] This blog aims to dig into the fundamentals of Azure RBAC and privilege escalation, Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC), and how focusing on individual permissions can uncover privileged attack paths. That's how we  discovered a built-in role that could have allowed arbitrary privilege escalation to Owner through unconstrained role assignment. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Karl Fosaaen, Thomas Elling ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] EVENmonitor ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/NeffIsBack/EVENmonitor</link>
<guid>https://github.com/NeffIsBack/EVENmonitor</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 05:17:21 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] Monitor the Windows Event Log with grep-like features or filtering for specific Event IDs ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Alex ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] USB Device Forensics on Windows 10 and 11 ]]></title>
<link>https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2026/02/usb-device-forensics-on-windows-10-and-11/</link>
<guid>https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2026/02/usb-device-forensics-on-windows-10-and-11/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:47:15 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Incident Response & Forensics ] To build a defensible chain for malicious use of an unauthorized drive, you typically correlate multiple layers: identify the device in the Registry, bound connection time using per-device timestamps and event logs, associate storage identity using a stable pivot, and then demonstrate interaction using file system artifacts. This correlation reduces ambiguity and produces a timeline that is less likely to be disputed than any single artifact in isolation. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Oleg Afonin ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Attacking and Defending SCOM: Management Server Relay and Obtaining Run As Credentials ]]></title>
<link>https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/attacking-and-defending-scom/</link>
<guid>https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/attacking-and-defending-scom/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:43:20 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Pentests & Red Teams ] Using proven techniques and practices and based on real experiences, this article will help to identify, exploit, detect and remediate SCOM vulnerabilities in the environments you assess and protect, while demonstrating attack paths, tools and techniques that you'll need to defend against. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Ryan Voit ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Anatomy of SystemOptimizer - A BYOVD EDR Killer with a UAC Bypass ]]></title>
<link>https://cham1ndux.github.io/posts/BYOVD-EDR-killer-with-a-UAC-bypass-and-a-lying-comment-block/</link>
<guid>https://cham1ndux.github.io/posts/BYOVD-EDR-killer-with-a-UAC-bypass-and-a-lying-comment-block/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:41:20 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Malware Analysis - Obfuscation, Evasion & LoL ] In this walkthrough, I analyze a Windows x64 executable named SystemOptimizer.exe. What initially appears to be a relatively small Windows executable turns out to contain an interesting multi-stage defense-evasion mechanism involving PowerShell, a UAC bypass, an embedded kernel driver, and a large list of security products targeted for termination. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Chamindu Pushpika ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] UAC Bypass - CMSTPLUA COM Exploitation ]]></title>
<link>https://0xsec.gitbook.io/0xsec/windows/uac-bypass-cmstplua-com-exploitation</link>
<guid>https://0xsec.gitbook.io/0xsec/windows/uac-bypass-cmstplua-com-exploitation</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We present a technique that leverages the auto-approved COM class CMSTPLUA and its ICMLuaUtil interface to call the ShellExec method and execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges, bypassing UAC. By injecting a crafted DLL into explorer.exe, an elevated COM moniker is created and ShellExec is used to launch cmd.exe as Administrator. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ 0xSec ]]></author>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [TOOL] CVE MCP Server ]]></title>
<link>https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server</link>
<guid>https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:37:07 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Threat Hunting ] Production-grade MCP server giving Claude 27 security intelligence tools across 21 APIs - CVE lookup, EPSS scoring, CISA KEV, MITRE ATT&CK, Shodan, VirusTotal, and more. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Mahipal ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Token Theft in Microsoft Entra ID - Part 2: Continuous Access Evaluation ]]></title>
<link>https://insinuator.net/2026/09/token-theft-in-microsoft-entra-id-part-2-of-4-continuous-access-evaluation/</link>
<guid>https://insinuator.net/2026/09/token-theft-in-microsoft-entra-id-part-2-of-4-continuous-access-evaluation/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:30:44 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Active Directory - Authentication - Public Cloud ] We delve into Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE), an event-driven mechanism in Microsoft Entra ID that enables near-real-time revocation of self-contained JWT access tokens, which otherwise remain usable for their full lifetime  even after account disable or refresh-token revocation.  ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Niklas Kerner ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] Activating Chrome DevTools Protocol in Memory: Bypassing -remote-debugging-port Restrictions ]]></title>
<link>https://www.pikered.com/en/learn/bypass-remote-debugging-port-restrictions/</link>
<guid>https://www.pikered.com/en/learn/bypass-remote-debugging-port-restrictions/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:25:49 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Browser Security ] A technical walkthrough of a new offensive technique that activates the Chrome Debugging Protocol directly in memory, bypassing Google's -remote-debugging-port mitigations. Covers chrome.dll signature scanning, DevToolsSocketFactory vtable reconstruction, PartitionAlloc constraints, and Special APC-based shellcode injection into the Chrome parent process. ]]></description>
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<item>
<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] StyleSmuggler: Magento and Adobe Commerce 0-day RCE under active attack ]]></title>
<link>https://sansec.io/research/stylesmuggler</link>
<guid>https://sansec.io/research/stylesmuggler</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:22:04 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We discovered StyleSmuggler, an unpatched Magento and Adobe Commerce zero-day that gives unauthenticated attackers remote code execution. It works by injecting malicious code into Magento's template system. By using the styles properties, it can evade existing safeguards. It works in two stages: inject PHP code - for example by generating a failure report, let Magento execute the poisoned code via a failed payment email. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Sansec Forensics Team ]]></author>
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<title><![CDATA[ [ARTICLE] From Padding Oracle to Shell: Unauthenticated RCE in Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX ]]></title>
<link>https://tantosec.com/blog/2026/09/telerik-padding-oracle-to-shell/</link>
<guid>https://tantosec.com/blog/2026/09/telerik-padding-oracle-to-shell/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 04:16:18 +0000</pubDate>
<description><![CDATA[ [ Exploits & Payloads ] We turned turned an unauthenticated AES-CBC padding oracle in Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX into remote code execution, chaining a decrypt-versus-parse oracle, a predictable HMAC key, and a type-name deserialisation gadget. ]]></description>
<author><![CDATA[ Marcio Almeida ]]></author>
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